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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

vs,
WALTER M. OGDEN AND SONS,
INC., and SEVIER COUNTY
TREASURER,
Civil No. 86-8-9837
Defendant.
VS.

RULON LIND and FLORA S. LIND,
his wife, Trustor; CORPORATION
OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF
THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS,Beneficiary;
and SEVIER COUNTY TREASURER,
Civil No. 10128
Defendant.
vs.
LAYGO COMPANY, a partnership,
CHRISTIE RICHARDS, JANICE
PARKER, LEANE JARRETTE, and
JEAN YOUNG,
Civil No. 10132
Defendant.
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vs.
J. D. SPRINGER,

Civil No. 10131
Defendant.

Pursuant to the stipulation of all counsel the abovereferenced matters came before the Court, sitting without a jury,
beginning Thursday, March 9, 1989, and continuing through Monday,
March 13.
The four cases were informally consolidated for hearing
on motions filed by each of the Defendants requesting the Court
to

fix a valuation date other than the date of service of

summons.

Further, the petitions requested the Court to require

payment of interest from the valuation date fixed by the Court
rather than the date the Orders of Immediate Occupancy were
entered.
The Court has carefully considered the evidence adduced
during the three days of hearings and has further considered the
extensive memoranda filed and the cases cited therein, including
particularly the Utah cases which have dealt with the valuation
date as well as payment of interest.
In order to properly treat the Defendants1 motions the
Court is called upon to make factual findings, legal rulings and
to resolve several mixed questions of law and fact.

No effort

has been made to compartmentalize these.
With the foregoing introduction the Court finds and
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concludes as follows, to-wit:
1.

The

Court

concludes

that

the

constitutional

requirement of "just compensation" set forth in Article I, §22 of
the Utah Constitution takes precedence over §78-34-9 & 11, and
that the latter cannot be strictly applied if such application
would undermine the constitutional requirement.
2.

The

Court

concludes

that

§78-34-11

creates

a

rebuttable presumption that the date for determining valuation in
eminent domain cases is the date of service of process.

In

reaching this conclusion the Court has relied upon and is in
agreement with the opinion of Justice Stewart in Utah State Road
Com'n vs. Fribercr, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984).
3.

After carefully considering all of the evidence

adduced the Court finds and concludes that if the trier of fact
were required to value Defendants1 properties as of the date of
service of summons

it would not

lead to an award of "just

compensation" as required by the constitution.
4.

The Court concludes that June 22, 1977, should be

the date of valuation in these cases.

This is the date when the

Environmental Impact Statement was officially approved by federal
authorities

and

the

general

corridor west

of Richfield

and

through these Defendants' properties was finally selected.
5.

The Court finds that there is a close relationship

between the date the corridor was officially selected on June 22,
1977, and the time frame in which these Defendants' properties
could reasonably have expected to have developed or to have been
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sold for potential development purposes absent the impact of the
interstate.
6.

Based

on

the

Court's

careful

reading

of the

Friberq decision and its consideration of precedents in other
jurisdictions, and after carefully evaluating all of the evidence
introduced, the Court determines that June 22, 1977 is the date
which is most likely to insure fundamental fairness in keeping
with the constitutional mandate of just compensation.
7.

Defendants own property within the corridor of

Interstate Highway 70, and were served with summons in eminent
domain proceedings on or about the following dates:

8.

a.

Laygo - October 15, 1987.

b.

Lind - October 12, 1987.

c.

Ogden - August 19, 1986.

d.

Springer - October 7, 1987.

Orders of Immediate Occupancy were entered under

the following dates:

9.

a.

Laygo - October 28, 1987

b.

Lind - October 28, 1987

c.

Ogden - September 10, 1986

d.

Springer - October 28, 1987

Interstate Highway 70 runs from Washington, D.C.

on the east to its merger with Interstate Highway 15 near Cove
Fort, and thence to Los Angeles.

With the exception noted below

the final segment of some three thousand miles of this interstate
is being constructed immediately west of Richfield City, Sevier
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County, Utah, where Defendant's property is located.
10.

Additional lanes are being completed in a remote

stretch between Fremont Junction in Emery County and Green River,
Utah, though the corridor was acquired and the Interstate has
been opened in that area for many years.
11.

There

is

evidence

indicating

that

this

last

construction west of Richfield was a result of the desire of
Richfield City so that the businessmen could get the advantage of
the business going through the City.
request

However, it was not at the

of these property owners and the effects upon these

property owners and the businessmen are entirely different.
12.

As

a

prerequisite

immediate

occupancy

appraised

values

of

the
the

to

Plaintiff
properties

entry

of the

tendered
being

into

orders of
court

taken.

its

Shortly

thereafter these deposited funds were withdrawn by the respective
Defendants.
13.

The Defendants do not challenge the right or the

necessity of the taking and have raised no defenses relating
thereto.

Rather

Defendants

challenge

the

adequacy

of

the

compensation which the Plaintiff has tendered.
14.

The Court holds that Defendants' withdrawal of the

funds deposited by the Plaintiff did not constitute a waiver or
abandonment of their right to question the appropriate date of
valuation.

The Court is of the opinion that the valuation date

is a matter relating to compensation and not a defense to the
taking.

Accordingly the Court determines that §78-34-9 as it
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relates to waiver of defense has no application.
15.
Valley

was

Construction

first

locally

of

the

interstate

announced

Newspaper on October 24, 1957.

through

Sevier

in the Richfield

Reaper

Between that date and the fall of

1987 there have been some 92 articles in the Richfield Reaper
regarding the interstate.
16.

The Court has considered the newspaper articles

not for the truth of the matters asserted, but rather as evidence
of what information was publicized in the local area.
17.
Reaper

The Court takes judicial notice that the Richfield

is a weekly

newspaper published

in Richfield, Sevier

County, State of Utah, and has wide circulation in Sevier Valley.
The evidence indicated that the local weekly circulation was
approximately 3,000 copies.
18.
announcement

Over
of

the

the

course

interstate

of

years

following

initial

project the Richfield

Reaper

publicized projected completion dates for the interstate highway
through Sevier Valley including the area where the properties of
the Defendants herein are located.

The Reaper attributed these

projected completion dates to UDOT Officials.
were inconsistent.
a.

The projections

They are as follows:
Richfield Reaper, July 29, 1965:

Projected

completion date was 1972.
b.

Richfield

Reaper,

October

13,

1966:

December

1,

1977:

Projected completion date was 1970.
c.

Richfield

Reaper,

7
Projected completion date was 10 years away (presumably 1987).
d.

Richfield

Reaper,

November

23,

1978:

Projected completion was moved up to 1979-80.
19.

None of the projected completion dates has proved

accurate, and completion of the project will carry
1990s,

well

over

30

years

from

the

date

of

into the
its

first

announcement.
20.

Plaintiff

considered

three different

alignments

through Sevier Valley, one on the east side, one in the center
and

one on the west.

Richfield

City

alignment."

and

is

The latter
hereafter

skirts the west side of

referred

to

as

the

"west

It is located in a confined area between the west

hills and Richfield's northwest residential sector.

Plaintiff

was required to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement before
the route could be selected.
21.

On the 18th day of March, 1977, the Environmental

Impact Statement was completed, and the west Richfield alignment
was officially approved by the Utah State Road Commission.
was

thereafter

officially

approved

by

the

Federal

It

Highway

Administration on June 22, 1977.
22.

Selection of the west alignment along the west

side of Richfield and through the property of these Defendants
received wide local publicity with front-page newspaper articles
in the following editions of the Richfield Reaper:

December 2,

1976, March 17, 1977, March 24, 1977.
23.

By

the

time

of

its

official

selection,

the

8
location of the corridor was already generally known.

Shortly

before the actual interstate alignment was finalized Richfield
City reacted to the anticipated selection of the west alignment
and the likely corridor location was published as part of the
City's official zoning map in the May 20, 1976 edition of the
Richfield Reaper.

A similar map reflecting the proposed west

alignment had been published on the front page of the Reaper as
early as September 7, 1972.

The zone map follows:
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24.

Richfield City has had a policy of declining to

approve any development within the proposed interstate corridor
as is evidenced by the following testimony given by City Manager
Woody Farnsworth in UDOT vs. Partington, Sevier Civil No. 10129.
The following testimony was received in evidence pursuant to
stipulation, but with the proviso that the City is an independent
political body from the State and is not controlled thereby:
Q. Thank you very much. During your years of
experience with the city, dating back into
the 1970s with the City Council and the
Planning Commission, has the city had a
general policy toward the interstate highway?
A. Yes, they did.
Q. What has that policy been?
A. Generally, it consisted with not approving
or allowing development around the freeway or
freeway land. [Farnsworth transcript p.19.]
25.
declining

to

The Plaintiff has encouraged the City's policy of
approve

development

in

the

proposed

interstate

experienced

dramatic

growth

corridor.
26.
residential

Richfield
construction

City

beginning

continuing through the decade.

in

the

early

1970s

in
and

Beginning in the year 1981 there

was a dramatic decline in residential construction.
27.

The fair market value of ground in or adjacent to

Richfield City being suitable for residential development was
substantially higher in 1977 and 1978 than it was in 1986 or
1987.
portion

This finding applies to land adjacent to the developed
of

Richfield1s

northwest

quadrant

where

Defendants1

10
properties are located.
28.

In arriving at the foregoing determination the

Court relies not only on comparable sales, but the following
factors

relevant

appraising:

to

an

income

capitalization

approach

to

(1) The decline in building permits in Richfield

City evidencing reduction in the need for building lots.
increased cost of subdivision improvements.

(2) The

(3J

The increase in

the cost of financing to a would-be developer.

(4) The Court's

own knowledge, judicially taken, of the economic down-turn in the
Richfield area and in the Sevier County area, and in fact in the
entire US 89 area all the way to the Arizona border.

During

recent years there has been reduced activity in land development
and home construction and a general decline in fair market value
of land in general.

The evidence supported these facts of which

the Court was already aware.
29.

During the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s, the

overwhelming amount of residential growth in Richfield was to the
northwest toward Defendants1 properties.
30.

The residential growth toward the northwest and

toward Defendants1 properties continued until the 1977-1978 time
frame when there was a dramatic shift elsewhere, principally
toward the southwest, with a lesser amount of development in the
northeast.

The Court finds this was caused by the interstate

designation.
31.

Beginning in 1950 and continuing through mid 1977

approximately 90% of the subdivisions newly approved or where

11
substantial

development

occurred

was

located

in the extreme

northwest portion of Richfield City adjacent to or approaching
the property of these Defendants.
32.
of

the

Subsequent to mid 1977 only some approximately 10%

subdivisions

newly

approved

or

in which

substantial

development occurred were located in the northwest portion of
Richfield City.
33.

The

shift

from

the

northwest

portion

of

the

community to other areas occurred when the natural growth trends
reached close proximity to the interstate corridor, the location
of which was widely known.
34.
altered

long

The

impending

construction

established

growth

of

the

interstate

patterns

and

precluded

residential development from moving on to the lands of these
Defendants.
35.

The

Court

finds

that

in

the

absence

of

the

interstate the subject properties had residential potential with
varying

degrees of ripeness.

purpose

of

ruling

on

the

This finding is only for the

pending

motions

and

each of the

Defendants as well as the Plaintiff is entitled to present to a
jury his/her or its theory of the highest and best use to which
the various properties could have been put absent the influence
of the interstate.
36.
reasonable

Portions of the properties of the Defendants have

access

to

all

electricity and telephone.

utilities,

including

water, sewer,

They are reasonably proximate to
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attractive neighborhoods in the highest area of residential zone
classification

in Richfield

City

and

in that sector of the

community wherein most of the public parks, schools, churches and
athletic fields exist.

Further the subject properties are toward

higher elevations which have been attractive to home builders in
communities throughout Utah.
37.

Stoppage

of

the

northwest

residential

growth

pattern is related to the anticipated location of the interstate
and not to the canal located in that area.

The canal could be

breached and had been breached before whenever desired by the
City.

Specifically, high quality residential development had

spawned above the canal in close proximity to the property of
these

Defendants

and

outside

of

the

designated

interstate

corridor.
38.

In the absence of the Interstate highway, there

are no legal obstacles to the annexation to Richfield City and/or
zone changes on any of Defendants1 properties.
39.
indicating

Each of the Defendants has performed overt acts

a design

to use their properties

for residential

purposes.
40.

It would have served no useful purpose for these

Defendants to have undertaken to further plat or develop their
properties when they had full knowledge the properties would be
taken for the interstate highway and when Richfield City had a
policy against any development within the contemplated corridor.
Equity does not require the performance of useless acts.

13
41.

Subsequent to the corridor selection on June 22,

1977 there were modest shifts of the actual right-of-way lines
and there was also a repositioning of the interchanges on both
the north and south ends of Richfield.

The west Richfield

alignment however remained firmly designated from the time of its
official selection until commencement of condemnation proceedings
against these Defendants some 10 years later and some 30 years
after the initial announcement of the freeway project.
42.

The right-of-way and interchange shifting, as well

as the failure to finalize the design, did not reduce, but rather
augmented the injury to the Defendant landowners, and extended
the period of uncertainty during which their ability to exercise
the incidents of property ownership was severely limited.
43.

The Court does not rely on a concept of fault or

blame, but finds that there was "undue protraction . . .

of the

condemnation process" within the meaning of the Friberg decision
(at 830).

For whatever reason it has taken the Plaintiff over

thirty years to complete the project, the protraction has worked
to the significant injury of the Defendant landowners.

The Court

sees no distinction between "undue protraction" after the filing
of suit, as in Friberg, and "undue protraction" before the filing
of suit.

The matter of ultimate consequence is the undermining

of each Defendant landowner's constitutional right to receive
just compensation.
44.

The

interstate

highway

created

a

condition

precluding the development of Defendants1 properties or the sale
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thereof for immediate or future development.
45.

As a practical matter these Defendants could not

have developed their property nor sold it a fair price for the
purpose of development.

They were obliged to just hold their

properties and pay the taxes on them until condemnation occurred.
46.

Because condemnation has occurred, the Defendants

have lost the opportunity to retain their lands until market
conditions improve.
47.
has been

Even under Plaintiff's view of the evidence there

a marked

decline

in the market value of potential

subdivision land within or in reasonable proximity to Richfield
City.

Under Plaintiff's view of the evidence, market value

peaked

sometime

in

between

1977

condemnation actions were commenced.

and

1986-87

when

these

Plaintiff claimed the value

peaked during or about 1980 and that the 1977 and 1986-87 values
are comparable.

Plaintiff claims thereby a failure to meet the

requirement

the

of

Friberg

decision

which

refers

to

a

"substantial difference" in value between the date of service of
summons and the date of valuation being considered.
48.

The Court does not accept Plaintiff's view of the

evidence, having determined that market value would have been
substantially higher in 1977 than in 1986-87.

More importantly,

the facts as advanced by Plaintiff, even if true, would not cure
the injustice to these Defendants.

Under such a situation they

would be chained to their land while the market went up and then
back down.

Both sides concur that the market is now down.
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49.

The Defendants have met the burden of overcoming

the statutory presumption that the valuation date be fixed on the
date

summons

is served.

This date would

not lead to just

compensation.
50.

The Court further determines that the Defendants

are entitled to recover interest at the statutory rate of 8% from
and after the date fixed for valuation.
22,

1977,

forward

each

of

the

At all times from June

Defendants

was

effectively

precluded from exercising important incidents of ownership over
their lands and were obliged to abandon all but the most nominal
kind of use. None of the Defendants received any return on their
property between June 22, 1977 and the date of institution of the
condemnation actions.
the Lind home.

A likely exception exists with respect to

While its marketability would have been severely

limited there may have been usage value to its owner.

The Court

reserves jurisdiction regarding the application of interest visa-vis the rental value thereof.
51.

In determining to impose interest the Court has

considered the statute which provides for interest only from the
date of service of summons, or from the date of actual occupancy
(§78-34-9).

While this statute may be constitutionally sound in

the overwhelming number of cases, its application under the facts
of

these

cases

compensation,

and

would

deprive

therefore

constitutional requirement.

would

these
be

Defendants
in

violation

of
of

just
the

In this connection the Court notes

the Friberg language to the effect that "just compensation means
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that the owners must be put in as good a position money wise as
they would have occupied had their property not been taken."
Further, the Court is aware of decisions of the Utah Supreme
Court which predate the Fribera decision and which have strictly
applied §78-34-9 regarding the payment of interest.

Specifically

the Court has considered City of South Oaden vs. Fuiiki, 621 P.2d
1254 (Utah 1980) and State vs. Peek, 1 U.2d 263, 265 P.2d 630
(Utah 1953).

While Fuj iki was cited in Friberg, the interest

issue was not faced since the valuation date was moved forward.
The Court is of the opinion that these cases have not fully come
to grips with the constitutional requirement of just compensation
and

also with the constitutional

concept

enunciated by the

United States Supreme Court in United States vs. Causby. 328 U.S.
256 at 261.

In that case the Court stated:

It is the owner's loss, not the takerfs gain
which is the measure of the value of the
property taken.
52.
substantially

As

heretofore

noted,

similar market value

Plaintiff

in 1977

and

claims

a

1986-87, but

claims a substantially higher market value during the interim.
If

the

Court

were

to accept

this

evidence

as

a basis for

declining to change the valuation date, or for declining to
require payment of interest, then Defendants would be put in the
untenable position of having their land held hostage for 10 years
while the market went up an down without a reasonable opportunity
to sell at fair value and without any return on the property
during the interim.

To award Defendants the same compensation 10

17
years later without interest would not be just.

As noted by the

Friberg court:
The
constitutional
requirement
of
just
compensation derives "as much content from
the basic equitable principles of fairness as
it does from technical concepts of property
law . . . [at 828] [Emphasis added]

DATED this

/b ^ day of «y|gh, 1989.
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DISTRICT COURTS'JUDGE

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
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I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS was placed in
the United

States mail

at Richfield, Utah, with

postage thereon fully prepaid on the

first-class

-3 ^ ^^day of March, 1989,

addressed as follows:
Mr. Stephen C. Ward
Attorney for Plaintiff,
UDOT vs. Ogden, UDOT vs. Lind
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
Mr. Alan S. Bachman
Attorney for Plaintiff,
UDOT vs. Laygo, UDOT vs. Springer
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
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